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At the end of World War II, the international community sought to prevent both
future wars and human rights violations by means of international law.  In the short span
between late 1945 and mid-1949, the world witnessed the creation of the United Nations
(1945), the promulgation of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948) and the
approval of the four Geneva Conventions on the laws of war (1949).  In the Americas, a
similar process was taking place.  In 1948, at a Conference in Bogota, the countries of the
Western Hemisphere created the Organization of American States, now formed by 35
independent States.  An important difference with the process at the universal level was
that, right from the start, the Americas created a regional political and diplomatic body,
but also approved a Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man.  Significantly, in the
same act, a Social Charter was also approved, with a roster of economic and social rights
mostly related to the world of labor; unfortunately, that charter is all but forgotten today.
The American Declaration predates the Universal Declaration by eight months. Its
unfortunate mix of rights and duties probably reveals an authoritarian streak in many
government representatives present at its inception.  Its reference to the rights “of man”
would rightfully be rejected today as non-inclusive language.  In spite of these
shortcomings, the American Declaration has survived the passage of fifty years and, even
today, is an important instrument.  The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has said,
in an advisory opinion, that the Declaration is binding on the member States of the OAS
by virtue of its incorporation into the OAS Charter.
3  Though an important debate
remains as to its binding nature, all Western Hemisphere countries agree that they have
pledged to live and govern by its precepts.
Another significant difference with the universal system is that the OAS in 1948
made an explicit link between human rights and democracy.  Today, international law
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seems to be moving towards a universal democratic principle.
4  In 1945, however, the
international community was more preoccupied with ideological and cultural inclusion as
a means to prevent war and to promote peace, so the emphasis was on the peaceful
coexistence of widely divergent political systems.  In that historical perspective, the
Western Hemisphere’s pioneering attitude may not have been as enlightened as it now
sounds.  The stated preference for democracy may well have been a part of the initial
stages of the Cold War, as well as a remnant of historical apprehensions about letting
European powers establish footholds in the continent.
As will be seen later, the democracy clause in the Americas was not taken as
seriously as in Europe, where a democratic form of government is a condition of
membership in the European Union.  Significantly, the adoption of the democracy clause
did relatively little to preserve the region as a truly democratic zone of the world.  In the
1940s and 1950s most countries were governed by caudillos, charismatic leaders who
governed as if an election was a blank check to impose their will on institutions and
people.  These authoritarian figures, even if clothed in a veneer of electoral legitimacy,
built political power bases outside the branches of government, mostly among corrupt
business elites or through the military forces.  Increasingly, powerful sectors and the
armed forces enjoyed high degrees of autonomy and non-accountability.  The outside
world looked critically upon these regimes, but tolerated and even encouraged them for
as long as they made the region safe for foreign investment.
When the winds of change of the 1960s swept through Latin America, they took a
particularly violent form in the region.  Disenfranchisement and lack of faith in
democracy combined with the mirage of success of the Cuban Revolution to feed the
hope of a generation that more just societies could be attained through political violence.
If armed revolutionary movements succeeded in anything, they pulled the “democratic”
mask off Latin American regimes and revealed the repressive cruelty of which they were
capable.  In the 1970s and 80s, harsh military dictatorships with pretensions of durability
in power governed most of the region; other countries had lame elected governments with
little or no control over the armed forces.  And the sphere of autonomy of the military
elites – not only to lead the counter-insurgency strategy, but also to decide on strategic
matters of natural resources and development – continued to grow.  In this period, the
military and their supporters developed the “national security doctrine” to justify this
accumulation of decision-making authority in non-accountable hands.
Lack of transparency, destruction of institutions of control, and domination of
public opinion through the media led – inevitably, it seems – to grotesque forms of
massive and systematic human rights violations.  In those countries where an active
guerrilla movement existed, there were also egregious violations of the laws of war
committed by all parties to the conflict.  Finally, the world reacted to the appalling
tragedy of forced disappearance, massacre of peasant villages, torture and prolonged
arbitrary detention.  Concern in the developed world led to loss of international and
domestic prestige by totalitarian governments and encouraged resistance.   In the 1970s
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and 80s, Latin America witnessed the birth of a strong movement in civil society to
defend human rights.  Over the years, it would diversify and develop into exemplary
organizations that offer hope for a brighter future.
The changing international scene in the 1980s and the bolder demands of civil
society made the military and military-dominated regimes increasingly unstable.  This led
in a relatively short time to a series of transitions to democracy in almost every country.
These transitions were probably inevitable; yet in all cases there were attempts (some
more successful than others) by the military to condition the pace and extent of the
reform.  In some cases, the military establishments wanted to retain control over key
political and economic decisions.  In all cases, they were intent on ensuring that they
would not be called to account for the legacy of human rights violations they were
leaving behind.  During the transition, they often bullied democratically elected
governments into preserving that sphere of impunity.
The transitional regimes were characterized by this tension between their
immediate need to consolidate themselves and avoid relapses into dictatorship, and their
aspiration to be true alternatives to the recent past.  The debate over impunity dominated
the agenda of the transition.  Self-amnesty, pseudo-amnesty and real amnesty laws,
pardons and other forms of clemency for the perpetrators were obstacles in the way of
creating a more democratic order.  Fortunately, victims and larger sectors of society
fought through those obstacles and insisted on accountability.  Some political leaders
responded positively to these societal demands.  The result was some prosecutions for
human rights abuses in a few well-known cases.  Although many of these initiatives were
ultimately frustrated, it must be pointed out that never before in the history of the
hemisphere had previously powerful men been brought to justice.  Truth commissions
were another form of accountability used in this period, sometimes as an alternative to
prosecution, but not necessarily so.  The experience gathered in Latin America with these
efforts to establish Truth and Justice in the face of massive violations and impunity has
been studied closely by societies in the rest of the world that later confronted similar
problems.
Truth Commissions were an important tool in this period for accountability for the
crimes of the recent past.  In 1983, newly elected President Raúl Alfonsín, of Argentina,
appointed a National Commission on Disappearance of Persons, chaired by the writer
Ernesto Sabato.  After a very active collection of information from all sources, in 1984 it
produced an important report called Nunca Más (“Never Again”) that established an
unimpeachable description of the machinery of death created by the military dictatorship.
Immediately thereafter, the Argentine courts heard the historic case against the members
of the three successive military Juntas that had governed the country between 1976 and
1982, which resulted in the conviction and sentencing of some men who had been
omnipotent only a few years before.  Restlessness in the armed forces over continued
prosecutions caused for different attempts at uprisings.  In the end, the Alfonsín
government enacted two pseudo amnesty laws.  His successor, Carlos Menem, closed the4
cycle with presidential pardons for the officers who had been convicted and for the few
who were by then awaiting trial.
5
Following this experience, the democratic government of Patricio Aylwin in Chile
created a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, chaired by Raúl Rettig and formed with
representative members of a wide political spectrum.  Rather than describe the patterns
and structure of repression in general, like the Sabato Commission had done, the Rettig
Commission gave each family of a victim an individualized version of the events, to the
extent that they were able to reconstruct them.  Because of the wide attention received by
these two experiments, the United Nations proposed a similar Truth Commission as part
of the peace accords in El Salvador.  This Truth Commission was the first one whose
members were not nationals of the country.  It was chaired by Belisario Betancur, former
President of Colombia, and its two other members were Prof. Thomas Buergenthal of the
United States and Reinaldo Figueredo, former Foreign Minister of Venezuela.  Its report
was an important milestone in the peace process.  Since its members had no faith that any
of the crimes they described would be prosecuted, they “named names” of the
perpetrators to the extent that they could establish them.  The Salvadoran government
promptly issued an amnesty law so that none of them could ever be investigated.  More
recently, the U.N. also sponsored a Truth Commission for Haiti, with mixed Haitian and
non-Haitian membership.  The work of this commission, and its report, never attained the
credibility or weight of its predecessors.  In Guatemala, the U.N. also sponsored a
Commission on Historical Verification, chaired by German Professor Christian
Tomuschat, with two Guatemalan members drawn from civil society (one, a woman of
indigenous origin).  Despite the fact that the mandate given to this commission by the
parties to the peace negotiations was unfairly limited from the start, the Commissioners
and their staff did a very credible job, obtained much fresh evidence, heard the victims’
families, and produced a very strong, sobering report.
Although not in the form of truth commissions, other Latin American countries
have followed in this path.  Paraguayan judges have seized records of the Stroessner
regime and allowed researchers to investigate them.  The Brazilian government has
created a process by which victims of military abuse in the 1960s and 70s can have their
claims heard and obtain compensation.  In Uruguay and Brazil, the efforts of civil society
(in the first case with active opposition of democratically elected leaders) have also
succeeded in breaking the cycle of silence.  The important legacy of these and similar
experiences is that the matter of accountability for past crimes has far outlived the
transitional periods (see Section III of this paper for latest developments on the “right to
truth”).  A key insight is not to see truth commissions as alternatives to justice, but as part
and parcel of a policy on accountability.  Truth Commissions succeed if society sees
them as an effort not only to know what happened, but also to acknowledge the plight of
the victims.  In such cases, efforts of this sort say much about the new democratic State
that these societies want to build.
6
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There is no question, however, that in proportion to the enormity of the crimes,
very little justice has been achieved and not enough truth has been disclosed.  Elected
leaders and their friends attribute this to the limitations of a transitional situation.  This is
unhelpful because it lowers the expectations about the governments’ performance
regarding human rights and democracy.  It constitutes an easy way for rulers not to live
up to their responsibility to build democratic institutions by using them even in politically
difficult cases.  Transitions cannot last forever and, by conventional standards at least, the
Latin American transition to democracy should be considered complete.
7 Some would
argue that many important features of democracy have not been achieved – doing justice
to past human rights abuses among them -- and, for that reason, Latin American
transitions still continue.
Whether these States are still in transition or not, they are certainly not full-
fledged democracies as they approach the end of the century.  For many reasons, Latin
America and the Caribbean are well short of what we would call fully functioning
democracies.   Evidently, there are important differences between countries, and
generalizations are always dangerous.  But there are traits that are common to the entire
region in one degree or another and we have called the present state one of “insufficient
democracy.”
8
This characterization is intended to emphasize the enormous advantage of the
present situation over what the region lived through in recent decades.  Insufficient or
not, democracy does offer an incomparably better structure to deal with all the problems
of human rights violations in the region.  One meaningful advantage is that almost
everywhere in the region there is now a free press and a vibrant debate about public
issues.  Of course, the fact that we can now change governments periodically via
elections is also an important aspect of this period.  However, our democracy is
insufficient because most of our problems originate in the residue of authoritarianism left
in our societies, and all of them could be treated effectively by deepening our
commitment to the rule of law, to equality of treatment and to democratic values.  In
other words, the problems of democracy in Latin America in the year 2000 are to be
solved with more democracy.
Our attempt at describing the features of “insufficient democracy” is made against
a model of democracy that would not require such an adjective.  That model goes far
beyond the existence of periodic, free and fair elections, and even beyond the effective
alternation in power of adversarial parties.  For us, democracy also means several other
things, all of them related to its day-by-day exercise by free citizens in a certain measure
of equal footing despite their many differences.  In order to practice democracy, citizens
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must see that there is an effort to include them in the formulation of policies of common
interest, regardless of their standing in the economy and of their membership in particular
social groups.  In other words, democracy must strive to eliminate the factors that exclude
certain members of the polity from the decision-making process.
In fact, in the Western Hemisphere there is a serious danger of going backward in
this regard.  There is evidence of diminished political participation even in elections.
Even more worrisome, participation in policy debates and formulation is increasingly
limited to fewer people.  The patterns of participation and non-participation mirror those
of participation in the economy: the poor participate less in politics, even if their stake in
the decisions adopted by government is arguably at least as high as that of any other.  In
some countries, the dated electoral machinery places a heavy burden of travel and
inconvenience on those who want to vote.  Mandatory voting only partially limits the
damage of reduced participation, and it is rarely enforced in any event.  As in the
developed world, electoral campaigns are becoming expensive and therefore dominated
by money.
If participation on election day is dwindling, day-by-day participation in policy
formulation is more rare now than in previous democratic moments in the history of Latin
America.  Social policy, where it exists, is made more and more by professional
politicians and bureaucrats or technocrats, with little or no debate among the public.
9  The
widening gap between rich and poor that characterizes Latin America has a definite
expression also in the strong differentiation in political participation by rich and poor.
The patterns of exclusion (from the economy as well as from politics) go beyond
rich and poor.  Social sectors that have suffered long term discrimination are similarly
excluded from the decision-making process.  In these democratic times there is more
awareness of the special situation of women, of indigenous peoples, of ethnic minorities
(especially African-American), and of children, especially if the latter belong also to any
of the previous categories.  But that awareness does not yet result in any attempt to
include them in the political process.  On the contrary, the disenfranchised are
increasingly more disenfranchised.
In addition, in many of our countries the political process yields benefits for a
certain breed of political leader, reminiscent of the old caudillos, though with a veneer of
modernism.  Free market economies and structural adjustment policies are embraced
easily by modern-day Latin American leaders.  But their loyalty to other principles of
liberalism is conspicuously absent.  In particular, they do not believe in self-restraint in
the exercise of power, which is a defining note of democratic rulers.  They believe that
the election is a blank check to exercise power the way they see fit.  As a result, they do
not feel constrained by notions of representation, much less by campaign promises; for
them, their election is an act of delegation of power by the electorate, without conditions
or restraints.
10  This trend towards concentration of power, to consider elections as
establishing winners and losers for all purposes, and to govern with little concern for the
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essence of democratic limits on power, has been rightly called sultanistic, in the words of
Max Weber.
11
Delegative democracy shows daily in the way some leaders react to any questions
by the public about personal or state finances.  It is particularly striking, however, in its
relation to the state of freedom of expression in the region.   There has never been a
period in our history where there has been a more aggressive and courageous exercise of
press freedom and particularly of investigative journalism.  And yet the journalistic
profession in Latin America remains as hazardous as ever.  There are alarming and well-
documented attacks on journalists, including killings.
12 Those attacks do not, by and
large, originate in government forces, but it is fair to say that governments are not
favorably inclined to allow the machinery of investigation and prosecution to act in
response to them.
More importantly, the normative framework in which freedom of expression is
exercised in Latin America and the Caribbean lags far behind the needs of a modern
democratic society.  For example, more than a dozen countries retain the offense of
desacato (contempt of a public official) in their criminal statutes, long after the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights has stated categorically that it is incompatible
with the American Convention on Human Rights.
13  The same Convention bans prior
censorship of any kind, yet some Latin American courts routinely forbid the circulation
of books and the exhibition of film, supposedly to protect the honor of living or deceased
persons.
14  Some countries have retained press laws meant to regulate freedom of
expression and the very existence of such laws has a chilling effect on expression,
whether or not they are consistently applied (and often, if they are applied at all, they are
inconsistently or arbitrarily applied).  Finally, slander and libel laws are also outdated
because they do not make distinctions between private and public persons who act upon
them, and thus inhibit the inquiry and debate that is essential in a democratic society.
15
The state of freedom of expression and of its guarantees is only a symptom of a
larger malaise.  For all the progress that has been made in elections (not just in having
them, but also in their being more fair and fraud-free), there is little or no progress in the
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development of other institutions that are just as essential to the rule of law.  The
administration of justice has never been, by and large, very credible in the region; but in
recent years it has in fact seen its effectiveness further eroded.  This is the result primarily
of neglect: there is insufficient perception of the need to invest in more modern and
efficient courts.  But it is also the result of the attitude of high officials who will trample
on the independence and impartiality of judges if they see the need to defeat any
challenge to their sultanistic or patrimonialistic use of power.  Courts are respected only
if they provide a measure of legitimacy to what the Executive branch has decided to do.
To be sure, international lending institutions and foreign development agencies
have placed great emphasis in the reform of the judiciary in recent years.  But local
authorities (executive, legislative or judicial) do not always share their enthusiasm.  Most
of these efforts are squandered because the object, pace and scope of the reform are left
to be decided by those who do not see a problem with the present state of the matter.
Latin American and Caribbean nations have tried to compensate for the weakness of
institutions designed to control government and to provide guarantees of human rights
protections.  Many such efforts have resulted in the creation of offices of the human
rights Ombudsman (Defensor del Pueblo, Defensor de los Habitantes, Protecteur des
Citoyens, Procurador de Derechos Humanos, Comision Nacional de Derechos Humanos
and so on).  The development of this institution is still a promising feature in Latin
American and Caribbean democracies, and more time is needed to evaluate its
achievements and shortcomings.
Perhaps the most salient aspect of the state of institutions of control is the acute
problem of lack of access to justice by large and underprivileged sectors of society.  Not
only is it hard and expensive for members of those categories to be heard by courts of
law, and legal services – when they exist at all -- are nowhere up to the task of
representing those who cannot afford private counsel.  Procedures are cumbersome and
long, and dominated by obscure and formalistic rituals.  And even substantive law has not
kept up with the needs of societies striving for modernization.  Again, unquestionably
there is some attention to this problem in present-day Latin America and the Caribbean.
Statutes allowing for alternative means of conflict resolution have been passed.  Their
impetus is not so much to enhance access to justice by the underprivileged, but to relieve
the courts from the pressure of their dockets.  Nevertheless, they could eventually have a
beneficial impact on both counts.  Until that happens, however, it is hard to think of
members of underprivileged sectors as citizens if they are unable to petition the courts for
redress of their grievances.
The weakness of institutions of control has direct bearing on the perception and
reality of impunity.  The legacy of impunity for egregious abuses of the past (discussed
earlier) is continued now by the absence of serious investigation, prosecution and
punishment of the abuses of power committed in democratic times by State agents,
particularly police forces.  Encouraged by a sense of insecurity in cities and streets, police
agents fight crime with extreme brutality, use torture as a regular interrogation technique,
and generally abuse their powers secure in the knowledge that they will not be brought to
account.  This results in more, not less insecurity, because a citizenry afraid of the police9
will not likely cooperate with it in fighting crime.  This paradox is lost, however, in the
rhetoric of politicians who exploit the fears of the citizens and promise mano dura
(toughness), which simply means looking the other way when police violate the rights of
any person.
Impunity is not restricted to police agents.  When a pervasive sense exists that
abuses of power will be tolerated, the lack of accountability spreads to issues of
corruption by high officials, by legislators, by magistrates, and even by business and
trade union leaders.  Democracies in which officials are not effectively accountable to the
electorate and to the law and its mechanisms are not sufficiently democratic.
16
Directly related to impunity is the matter of the proper response to a violation of a
human rights norm.  Unquestionably, abuses of power will and do take place in all
systems, and even citizens of model democracies will sometimes encounter such an
occurrence.  What distinguishes democracy from other systems is precisely the
institutional response to such abuses.  A human-rights-respecting State is one that not
only does not commit violations, but also one in which any instance of abuse triggers the
machinery of control of the State so that such actions are investigated, prosecuted and
punished in good faith.
17  The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has said that
international law obliges the State to organize its whole apparatus in such a way as to
afford effective protections to all persons under its jurisdiction.
18  Even if, in our time,
there are no massive and systematic violations of rights committed as State policy in
Latin America, the lack of institutional response to those abuses that are indeed
committed constitutes a serious deficiency.
Our next point in describing the insufficiencies of our democracies relates to the
debate about the role and meaning of civil society in a modern democracy.  As the State
is forced to divest and abandon important services it once provided, the conventional
wisdom is that “non-governmental organizations” (NGOs) will naturally step in and fill
the gaps.  In fact, many international development agencies promote this idea by
financing such NGOs, whether or not they are legitimate and spontaneous creations of the
societies where they act.  On the part of government leaders, there is an openly
contradictory message: on the one part, economic policies are put in place that cancel
services long provided by the government, and organizations of civil society are expected
to take on those roles without gaps in their delivery.  The State may be absent, but it is
not its fault if organizations of civil society are non-existent.  In fact, civil society is now
expected to fulfill tasks that should never have been abandoned by the State, like those
related to security of the citizenry.  On the other hand, governments show open hostility
to those organizations of civil society that do exist, especially if they take their duties
seriously in regards to preserving their independent and critical stance vis-à-vis
governmental policies.  In those cases, political leaders will dismiss NGOs as “non-
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representative,” even though it is in the nature of these organizations to represent only the
cause they serve, not any particular constituency.
Despite this misunderstanding about the role of spontaneous and autonomous
organizations of civil society, there is no question that they exist and grow in present-day
Latin America and the Caribbean.  Organizations that were born as a response to political
repression now have expanded their mission to look into what Jose Zalaquett calls
“endemic violations,” in the sense that they are there in democratic as well as non-
democratic times.  NGOs now defend the rights of incarcerated and institutionalized
persons and highlight the need for more humane prison conditions; they defend “street
children” victimized by crime as well as by neglect; they represent landless peasants and
persons displaced because of conflict over land.  They also promote the right of
indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities collectively and individually to enjoy their
culture; and they promote laws and standards to eliminate all forms of invidious
discrimination.
19  Many times these NGOs have to combine advocacy with direct
delivery of services, and the funding is always scarce, especially in a region that the rest
of the world has – perhaps prematurely – pronounced democratic and therefore no longer
a priority for international assistance.
The income distribution gap is becoming wider in Latin America, a region that
has always had the widest dividing line between rich and poor in the world.  The impact
of this on the quality of democracy cannot be underestimated.  Although it may be hard
to measure the relationship, it is clear that equality of access to services and to political
participation cannot be sustained while larger numbers of persons fall beneath the poverty
line.  Although the equality that is a goal of democracy is not economic equality, the
exercise of rights does need a foundation of satisfaction of basic needs.  Even in poor
countries, the quality of democracy would be enhanced by policies designed to protect all
from falling through the safety nets.  Instead, in most of the region those safety nets are
simply disappearing.  Under those conditions, some countries (but not all) may indeed
experience economic growth in macroeconomic terms; but that growth is not strictly
speaking development, especially because it is hard to see it as self-sustaining.  And it is
certainly not the implementation of a “right to development,” since this concept assumes
the ability of all to participate fairly in the benefits of economic growth.
II.  The Inter-American system of protection of human rights:
If the “democracy clause” has had only a limited effect on the creation of truly
democratic conditions in the domestic sphere of each country, at least it could be
expected to act internationally as a check against anti-democratic adventures.  Here, the
record is also checkered at best.  The only time in which the clause was applied as a
sanction against a non-democratic regime was in 1962, at the Punta del Este General
Assembly.  The Cuban Government had its rights of membership in the OAS suspended
(while the Cuban State retained its obligations), a situation that remains the same today.
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Previously, in 1952, it was invoked at another General Assembly to isolate the reformist
government of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala, a diplomatic gesture that served later to
legitimize the military invasion of the country.
20 It was never even mentioned to express
any concerns about interruptions of democracy that led to the dictatorships of Pinochet in
Chile, Videla in Argentina, the 1964 coup d’etat in Brazil.  The countries that voted to
isolate Guatemala in 1952 and Cuba in 1962 were led, among others, by “elected” leaders
like Trujillo, Somoza and Stroessner; the democracy clause was never invoked to inquire
on the manner in which they ruled their own countries.
With the era of transitions to democracy, interest in the clause has had a revival of
sorts.  In 1991, the General Assembly approved the “Commitment of Santiago” by which
the democracies of the Americas pledged to respond collectively to threats to the
constitutional order in any sister nation.
21  This declaration has been ratified in several
successive General Assemblies, and complemented by the Presidents of the American
nations in the Protocol of Washington.
22  Less than a year after the Santiago
Commitment, the region was confronted with the “self-coup” of April 5, 1992, when
President Alberto Fujimori of Peru dissolved Congress and stripped the judiciary of its
tenure and independence.  Hector Gros Espiell, then Minister of Foreign Relations of
Uruguay and Chair of the General Assembly, was appointed by the OAS to apply the
Santiago rule and negotiate a return to democracy in Peru.  As a result of the shuttle
diplomacy that ensued, in late 1992 Fujimori held elections for a Constituent Democratic
Congress (CCD in Spanish) and won them handily.  The OAS declared the job done,
even though the opposition had boycotted the election.  The CCD eventually enacted a
Constitution that concentrates power in the Executive Branch.  Even today, Peru has not
recovered an independent judiciary.
The Santiago Commitment fared better in the following attempts to replace
democratic institutions with authoritarian and concentrated power.  In Guatemala,
international pressure – led by the OAS – succeeded in turning back President Jorge
Serrano’s attempt to dissolve Congress and the courts, an experiment doubtless inspired
in Fujimori’s success.  In Haiti, the military coup against Jean-Bertrand Aristide elicited
an immediate response by the OAS.  Although it took more than two years to restore
Aristide to the presidency, as well as the involvement of the United Nations and President
Clinton’s willingness to deploy U.S. forces, the OAS stayed engaged and provided
leadership.
                                                          
20 Kinzer, Stephen and Schlesinger, Stephen, Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in
Guatemala, Doubleday, Garden City, NY, 1982.
21 GA Res. No. 1080.  It took the OAS 46 years to adopt a doctrine first proposed by Uruguayan Foreign
Minister Rodriguez Larreta in 1945.  Earlier, the proposal had been rejected as vague and interventionist in
nature, especially because of the lack of a treaty as its basis (the Charter of the OAS later filled that void) or
of any mechanism of implementation (this aspect is still lacking in the Santiago Commitment).  See Gros
Espiell, Hector, La democracia en el sistema interamericano, p. 129, and Cancado Trindade, Antonio A.,
Democracia y Derechos Humanos, p. 515.
22 Protocol of Reforms to the Charter of the OAS, signed in Washington on 14 December 1992.  An article
was added to the Charter of the OAS, and certain other articles were amended, in connection to the defense
of democracy in the hemisphere.12
The balance of this reaffirmation of the democracy clause in the 1990s is mixed.
It appears, on the positive side, that Latin American democracies emerging from years of
military tyranny do act sincerely in reacting to threats to constitutional order in their
neighboring countries.  Debates about these events at the General Assembly or at
specially convened meetings of Foreign Ministers do contribute to de-legitimize
undemocratic adventures.  But there is a tendency to be satisfied, like in Peru, with a
nominal return to elections, as long as they are more or less defensible as expressions of
majority opinion, though not fully free and fair by more rigorous standards.  The effect is
to lend an aura of international legitimacy to regimes that are certainly not democratic in
the way they exercise power.  There is also no desire to use objective mechanisms in the
course of negotiations under the Santiago Commitment.  Independent organs like the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights should play an important expert role in
determining the extent of violations of human rights and democracy and thus assist the
diplomatic negotiators.  Instead, there is no desire to rely on the Commission’s findings
or even to seek its advice.
Perhaps an important reason for this unsatisfactory state of development of the
link between human rights and democracy is structural and not simply political.  In the
European system, a democratic form of government and ratification of the European
Convention on Human Rights are conditions of membership in the European Union, both
for applications made by prospective members and for those who have already joined.
As a result, participation in the benefits of an international organization is predicated on
each State’s acceptance of these conditions, and – significantly – on its willingness to
abide by decisions of the organs designed to adjudicate human rights complaints.
Resistance to those decisions can lead to suspension from the Union, and the Council of
Ministers regularly monitors compliance with the decisions of the European Court with
that possible result in mind.  When the “dictatorship of the colonels” governed Greece, in
the 1960s, the threat of suspension was effectively applied.  Greece withdrew voluntarily,
but it did not return to the European fold until democracy was restored.  In contrast,
American States can choose to ratify the American Convention on Human Rights or not
to do so.  Though they are obligated to abide by the decisions of the Inter-American
Court (if they have ratified the Convention), the only mechanism contemplated in case of
non-compliance is the Court’s annual report to the General Assembly.  In recent years,
the General Assembly has refused systematically to debate any report of non-compliance
of this sort. The result is that the price to pay in the Americas for being undemocratic or
for refusing to accept binding decisions of specialized organs is simply not very high.
These shortcomings notwithstanding, the region has, over the years, created an
important system of international protection of rights.  It is based on the Charter of the
OAS and the American Declaration, mentioned earlier, but more recently it incorporates
more sophisticated and progressive instruments.  The most important is the American
Convention on Human Rights, also known as Pact (or Covenant) of San Jose de Costa
Rica.
23  Other important human rights instruments are the Inter-American Convention on
Forced Disappearances, the Inter-American Convention against Torture, the Convention
on the Prevention of Violence against Women (also known as Pact of Belem do Para),
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and an additional protocol to the Pact of San Jose de Costa Rica on economic, social and
cultural rights, known as the Protocol of San Salvador.
The American Convention is fundamentally a civil and political rights treaty, but
its Art. 26 is a window to economic, social and cultural rights that has not yet been fully
used.  Among its substantive norms, it is worth noting that freedom of expression
receives a more progressive treatment in the American Convention than either in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the European Convention.  Prior
censorship is forbidden under any circumstance, except in public exhibitions and then
only for the protection of minors.  State parties must outlaw “hate speech,” but only
insofar as it constitutes instigation to commit crimes or acts of violence.  In contrast, the
ICCPR and the European Convention require prohibition of this kind of speech even if it
only results in instigation to discrimination. The Inter-American formula strikes a better
balance between free speech and the demands of tolerance of diversity.
24  In the
American Convention, freedom of expression encompasses the right to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas of all kinds, the prohibition of restrictions by indirect
methods and means, and the right to reply to inaccurate or offensive statements.
25
The “right to life” clause in the American Convention (Article 4) includes a
controversial qualification that does not exist in other multilateral treaties: that the right
to life “…shall be protected…in general, from the moment of conception.”  This has been
interpreted as an obligation to prohibit abortions.  However, there has only been one
decision by the Commission on this matter, and in a divided vote it stated that that
language does not imply an obligation to prohibit abortion.
26  The area in which the
American Convention is definitely less protective of rights than the ICCPR or the
European Convention is on suspension of guarantees during emergencies, generally
known as the “derogation clause.”  The ICCPR and the European Convention set a high
standard for derogation: the emergency has to be so serious as to affect “the life of the
nation.”  In contrast, in the Americas, State parties can suspend certain important rights
“in time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the independence or
security of a State Party…” (Article 27).  As it may be obvious, in Latin America almost
any excuse is enough to declare a threat to national security, and to govern for prolonged
periods under a state of emergency.  Perhaps by way of compensation, Article 27
includes, among the rights that cannot be suspended under any circumstance, the right to
political participation, a novelty with little significance in a region where coups d’etat
have so frequently suspended this right or rendered it meaningless.
The American Convention’s greater contribution to the development of
international law is in the institutions and mechanisms it creates.  An Inter-American
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Membership in an association prescribed by law for the practice of journalism,Nov. 13, 1985; and Inter-
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Commission (IACHR) and an Inter-American Court (IACtHR) are the organs of
implementation and the authoritative interpreters of the Convention.  Historically, the
IACHR was founded in 1959 by General Assembly resolution and with a mandate
limited to promotional activities.  Soon it understood its mandate as an authorization to
receive complaints against certain practices and to process them.  In 1967 there was a
Charter amendment and the IACHR was incorporated as a “principal organ” of the
Organization of American States, thus becoming a treaty-based organ.  In 1969, it was
also incorporated into the American Convention, a specifically human rights treaty.  The
Convention created a second organ, the Inter-American Court on Human Rights
(IACtHR), and established competencies for and institutional relations between both
organs.  The American Convention entered into effect in 1979, and at that time the Court
came into being.
The Inter-American system is one of the three existing regional systems of
protection that coexist with the universal treaty-based and non-treaty-based mechanisms.
Regional systems exist also in Europe and Africa.  Their distinguishing feature is their
preference for judicial and quasi-judicial approaches, whereas universal (i.e., United
Nations-based) procedures regarding individual complaints are generally non-judicial and
even conciliatory in nature.  Of the three regional systems, the European is by far the
most developed, and the African the least developed.  Coincidentally, the European is the
one that has gone farthest in the judicial nature of the process (Africa has only a
Commission, and a Court will be created only after a proposed Protocol is ratified by the
requisite number of States).  As can be surmised, the European system enjoys the highest
rate of “efficacy” in the sense of compliance by States with its decisions, and the African
is the weakest in that sense.  The Inter-American system lies in between these two on all
of those counts.
Members of the IACHR are elected at the General Assembly by the votes of all
Member States.  Only the States that have signed and ratified the Convention (24 of the
35 OAS States at this time) choose Court magistrates.  Each body is composed of seven
members who serve in their personal capacity as experts, not representing any State.  A
Secretariat or Clerkship and professional staff also assists each body.  The Court has two
types of jurisdictions: advisory and contentious (adversarial in better English).  In its
advisory capacity, the Court can receive requests from States that have ratified the
Convention and from several OAS organs – including the Commission – to issue an
“advisory opinion” on the correct interpretation of a treaty obligation regarding human
rights.  There have been already 16 advisory opinions, and several of them have advanced
important concepts in the progressive development of rights.
In its contentious jurisdiction, the Court can receive cases submitted to it by the
Commission against States that have made an additional declaration of acceptance of this
possbility (21 States at this writing).  Additionally, cases can be submitted by a State
party against a Commission decision, or by a State party against another State party,
invoking a violation of an obligation under the American Convention.  In practice,
however, State parties never avail themselves of this access to the Court; all cases15
resolved so far have originated in Commission submissions.
27  Nevertheless, the Court
has been able to compile an impressive record of progressive decisions regarding matters
like forced disappearance of persons,
28 arbitrary detention and criminal due process,
29
compensation for massacres of indigenous populations,
30 and so on.
For its part, the Commission combines promotion and adjudication functions.
The IACHR advises governments on legislation or proposed legislation affecting human
rights, with or without a formal request.  It also publishes “country reports” of an
occasional nature, usually after an on-site visit, describing objectively and
comprehensively the human rights situation in the nation.  It has, from time to time,
advanced a standard-setting agenda by drafting and proposing new instruments for
consideration by the General Assembly and the Member States.  As an adjudicator of
claims against States, the IACHR can receive complaints against all member States of the
OAS.  For those that have not ratified the Convention, the IACHR examines the
complaint under the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man.  If the State
has ratified the Convention, the case is heard under the latter treaty and using the
relatively structured procedures established therein.  If the country has made an
additional declaration accepting the contentious jurisdiction of the Court, the
Commission can, at its discretion, submit the case to the Court.  If the country is a
signatory of the Convention but has not accepted the Court’s automatic jurisdiction, the
Commission can “invite” the State to accept it on an ad hoc basis.
Precisely this diversified approach to the system’s jurisdiction to hear complaints
is fast becoming one of its weaknesses.  The original intent – just like at the United
Nations – was to promote adherence to the treaty by making it easier for countries to take
some obligations but relieve themselves of others.  It is hard to tell if the result has been
positive in that sense (i.e., would we have more or less ratifications if the norms were
more strict?).  Undoubtedly, however, the system has resulted in a bewildering
combination of country obligations.  In addition to the possibilities outlined in the
previous paragraph, there are also the following: (a) Trinidad and Tobago has denounced
the Convention altogether.  As regards this country, the Commission and the Court retain
jurisdiction for all cases occurring within one year after Trinidad and Tobago deposited
the instrument of denunciation.
31 Thereafter, cases can be heard only by the Commission
and under the Declaration, not under the Convention.  (b) Peru has deposited an
instrument that purports to withdraw, “effective immediately,” its acceptance of the
contentious jurisdiction of the Court, but not its ratification of the Convention.
32  (c) With
                                                          
27 The only exception is the early case of Viviana Gallardo, submitted by Costa Rica against herself, over
the objections of the Commission.  The Court dismissed the case (IACtHR, Decision of 13 November
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28 IACtHR, Velásquez Rodríguez Case, cit., and Godínez Cruz Case, Judgment on Merits of Jan. 20, 1989.
29 IACtHR, Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, Judgment of September 17, 1997.
30 IACtHR, Aloeboetoe et al. v. Surinam, Reparations, Judgment of September 10, 1993.
31 Art. 78.
32 In September 1999, the Court declared that declaration invalid, and retained jurisdiction over two
pending cases against Peru (Tribunal de Garantias Constitucionales and Ivcher).  Prof. Héctor Gros
Espiell, who as Chair of the General Assembly had negotiated Peru’s “return to the democratic fold” (see
above), has openly sided with Fujimori on this latest attempt to undermine the Inter-American Court, the
only international law specialist to do so.  Besides criticizing decisions of the Court to which he once16
respect to Cuba, the Commission has long stated that its suspension from the OAS affects
its rights of membership but not its obligations under the American Declaration, so it has
continued to receive complaints and issue decisions and “country reports.”  Cuba not only
ignores these decisions but also refuses to cooperate with the Commission in any way. (d)
Finally, the Convention allows countries to make reservations to its provisions, in
conformity with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969.
33
The problem with this state of affairs is that it provokes ill-feelings in countries of
the region that ratify the Convention with few or no reservations and accept the
jurisdiction of the organs, when they compare themselves to other members of the OAS
that are not parties to it.  It seems unfair to those who contribute to the development of
international law that they then become singled out for criticism when they receive an
adverse decision by the organs.  Instead of prompting a renewed effort to promote
signature and ratification by all eligible States, this perception often leads to a discussion
of reform of the system.  If the starting point is this dissatisfaction, it is easy to see how
most proposals for reform are geared towards the lowering of standards.
34  The treaty
organs, academics and the growing number of users of the system do not think this would
be a fair bargain.  They point, instead, to the many ways in which the system can be
improved upon without resort to an amendment process that may well result in retreat
from what has been achieved so far.
35
The debate about reform of the system had its peak in 1996 and 1997, when the
IACHR and the Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs of the Permanent Council of
the OAS held conferences and convened practitioners, academic experts and government
representatives.  Those debates resulted in important discussions about the strengths and
weaknesses of the system, and on how to move it in a forward direction.  Proposals for
reform that would have had the effect of weakening the institutions were largely set
aside.
36  In May 1998, however, the debate about the system took a wholly different turn,
when Trinidad and Tobago surprisingly denounced the Convention, as mentioned above.
The stated reason for this decision was that the protracted proceedings before the IACHR
in death penalty cases lengthened the period between imposition of a death sentence and
its execution, which could result in the country being responsible for cruel, inhuman and
                                                                                                                                                                            
belonged, Gros Espiell opined favorably about the “immediate effect” of this unprecedented withdrawal of
consent to jurisdiction, even though it meant that Peru would not abide by the Court’s decisions in the
pending cases.  Those cases include one in which Fujimori disbanded Peru’s Constitutional Court.  In
Guatemala, an attorney representing a right-wing party filed a constitutional challenge to the country’s
acceptance, in the 1980s, of the Court’s jurisdiction, alleging that a vote by Congress was necessary.  In
October 1999, the Constitutional Court of Guatemala rejected the challenge on a 4-3 vote.
33 Art. 75
34 See, for example, Edmundo Vargas Carreño, Intervención del Representante de Chile durante la Sesión
Ordinaria del Consejo Permanente de la OEA, 27 Noviembre 1996, in El futuro del Sistema
Interamericano de Protección de los Derechos Humanos, Juan E. Mendez and Francisco Cox, editors,
IIDH, 1998, p. 49.
35 Pedro Nikken, Perfeccionar el Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos sin Reformar el Pacto de
San Jose, in El Futuro del Sistema Interamericano…, cit.
36 Mendez and Cox, El Futuro del Sistema…, see previous footnote.17
degrading treatment.
37  This action is significant because no other country in the world
had ever denounced a human rights treaty.  There was only very mild discussion in the
General Assembly of 1998 in Caracas, which met only days after this announcement.
Although the denunciation could not take effect until one full year had elapsed (see
above), Trinidad and Tobago refused to attend Court hearings on precautionary measures,
and openly defied Inter-American Court orders to suspend some executions.  In fact, only
a few days before the General Assembly of Guatemala, in June 1999, Trinidad and
Tobago executed persons named by the Court in such orders.  This time there was not
even any debate at the General Assembly, despite a specific request by the Court to put
the matter on the agenda.
In July 1999, Peru filed the instrument mentioned earlier.  Though there has not
been a meeting of the General Assembly after this development, the response by the
political organs and by representatives of other member States has been muted at best.
These episodes may well encourage other States to follow the paths of Trinidad and
Tobago and Peru, especially if politicians continue to win elections by espousing
toughness against crime.  The Convention does represent an obstacle to reinstatement of
the death penalty and to expanding it to new criminal offenses, and it could be an
obstacle to legislation cutting down on judicial protections.
38  In any event, the spirited
and principled response of the two treaty organs to these challenges is a hopeful sign that
the storm will be weathered.
To complete this section, it is important to mention that the United Nations has
also contributed to international protection of human rights in the Americas.  Most Latin
American and Caribbean nations are also signatories of the ICCPR and of other universal
treaties, and generally accept the jurisdiction of treaty organs.  In particular, the Human
Rights Committee (the treaty organ of the ICCPR) has had occasion to produce important
decisions regarding cases in Latin America, via its case complaint mechanism and its
periodic country reports.  Some of the non-treaty-based mechanisms like Special
Rapporteurs and thematic Working Groups have also exerted influence in the
improvement of conditions in the region.
In recent years, however, the United Nations has protected human rights in the
region quite successfully by means of a different and more innovative approach.  As the
UN involved itself in making peace in various domestic armed conflicts, it has developed
a certain “doctrine” that puts great emphasis on human rights, not solely as an ultimate
objective of the peace process, but also as a confidence-building measure and a step
toward peace.  Field operations to monitor human rights violations, mounted in El
Salvador, Haiti and Guatemala in the 1990s, have had a significant impact in both senses.
Despite some loss of momentum after initial impetus, they are generally seen as highly
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successful enterprises.  Significantly, the UN has also promoted and executed some
controversial initiatives with similarly good results.  This is especially true when the UN
has borrowed pages from Latin America’s own experiences and created Truth
Commissions as a way for societies to reckon with the crimes of the past and to seek
reconciliation without oblivion.
39
More recently, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has
established programs of technical assistance in the region.  At this writing there are
programs of that sort in El Salvador, Guatemala, Bolivia and Colombia.  In Colombia, the
program includes as well a small monitoring operation.  Both the OAS and the UN could
play important roles in seeking and making peace in the remaining armed conflicts in the
region.  In Colombia, peace talks are under way.  In Chiapas, Mexico, the talks initiated
under the Agreement of San Andres seem stalled at this moment.  Experience shows that
when the actors to the conflict have the political will to “internationalize” the peace
process (among other ways by calling on the UN and the OAS to cooperate), it is possible
to break the deadlock and advance towards peace.  Experience also shows that even the
existence of a serious peace process contributes enormously to the alleviation of tensions
and to diminishing the incidence of human rights abuse.
III.  Human Rights and Domestic Institutions
The recent years of democratic renewal in Latin America have resulted also in an
important process of constitutional reform.  Invariably, the new constitutions or their
most recent amendments have incorporated human rights treaties into the law of each
Nation.  This positive aspect of constitutional law making should not hide the fact that, at
least in some cases, constitutional reform was pursued as a means to allow re-election of
incumbent Presidents or otherwise to legitimize concentration of power in the dominant
parties.  In addition, specific mention of international human rights instruments in the
new Constitution can be a meaningless gesture unless there is also the political will to
enact implementing legislation, or on the part of judges an inclination to enforce
international obligations directly.
Nevertheless, the trend towards incorporation of the international law of human
rights in the text of the new constitutions is an important new development.  In some
cases, the full text of all treaties ratified by the country is reproduced as constitutional
text, and special majorities in Congress are required to denounce a human rights treaty.
40
In other cases, international instruments that have been ratified are incorporated by
reference in the new constitutional text, or else a general reference to “human rights
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treaties” is included as the description of the body of law to be applied.
41  These
differences, in turn, have bearing on the position that international treaties occupy in
relation to other laws of the country.  Most Latin American countries accept the notion
that treaties (especially human rights treaties) prevail over acts of Congress, and are
trumped only by the Constitution itself.  At the very least, they are considered in the same
hierarchy as laws, and courts are supposed to give them immediate effect once they have
been ratified.
42
Despite this, in general, Latin American judges are not particularly known for
applying international human rights norms directly.  There are, however, important recent
trends in the opposite direction.  The Constitutional Court of Costa Rica has stated that
international human rights have prevalence even over the country’s Constitution.
43  The
same court ruled that a law of mandatory affiliation of journalists to a professional
association was unconstitutional, on the basis of an advisory opinion of the Inter-
American Court that had stated that such laws violate the freedom of expression clause of
the American Convention.
44  The Argentine Supreme Court, in a 1995 case, said that
international treaties are directly applicable in domestic law and that judges are obliged to
apply not only their text, but also interpretations of them emanated from authoritative
organs.
45
It is also fair to point out that, in general, Latin American and Caribbean states in
the last decade of the XXth century have continued and deepened a tradition of
constructive contribution to the development of international law.  This has been
particularly true in their support for new instruments for the protection of human rights.
Latin American and Caribbean nations generally vote in support of the more progressive
alternatives, and are generally in the forefront of efforts to ratify human rights treaties.  In
international forums where these matters are discussed, the nations of this part of the
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This case referred to the length of preventive detention, and the Supreme Court of Argentina decided that
the IACHR’s interpretation of the American Convention was directly binding on Argentine courts.  More
recently, however, without revoking Giroldi explicitly, the same court, in a case called Acosta, ruled
against the release, via amparo, of persons whose conviction the IACHR had ruled to violate due process
under the American Convention.20
world tend to form solid blocks and to act in agreement with the most advanced
democracies of the world.  This was especially visible in the drafting of the Rome Statute
for an International Criminal Court, completed in 1998.  It was also true in the drafting
process of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and its quick ratification.
The most recent example is the decisive role of key Latin American governments for an
Additional Protocol to the Convention on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW).
46
The process of incorporation of international norms into domestic legislation has
undoubtedly been assisted by the work of both the IACHR and the IACtHR.  In
individual cases as well as in country and thematic reports, the Commission has
repeatedly called on governments to amend legislation that is inconsistent with
obligations under the American Convention or other treaties.  The Court has done the
same in several instances, both in decisions on contentious cases and in advisory
opinions.  These opinions are important particularly in matters affecting the impartiality
and independence of the judiciary, particularly as they affect due process rights of
criminal suspects.  “Faceless courts” and military courts with jurisdiction to try civilians
have thus been deemed in violation of international law.
47  The IACHR has also recently
made an exhortation to all governments in the system to adopt jurisdictional norms in
their legislation to give effect to the principle of universal jurisdiction for genocide, war
crimes and crimes against humanity.
48
In some ways, it is possible to see efforts to legislate human rights and to sign and
ratify treaties merely as token gestures, especially considering the slow pace of change in
actual conditions in each country regarding those violations that we have called
“endemic.”  A serious problem in the legal and political culture of this region is a
tendency to write laws without any serious effort to put them in practice.  For example,
despite the many lofty statements about respect for human rights, democratic
governments do not seem to think that the matter deserves an integral, determined,
sustained effort in the form of a policy of protection and promotion of rights.  An
important exception to this is the National Human Rights Plan announced by President
Fernando Henrique Cardozo in Brazil.
49  As a relatively unique instance of national
human rights policy, it would be important to evaluate the degree of implementation and
results obtained by this plan.
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Even without such comprehensive policy planning to obtain effectiveness in
human rights protection, many Latin American countries have incorporated a new
institution in their constitutional or legislative frameworks, variously known as Defender
of the People, Procurator for Human Rights, National Commissioner or National
Commission for Human Rights, and so on.  Some of these institutions are national in
nature, in the sense that the office has jurisdiction or competency over the whole territory.
In federal systems, there are also many local and state or provincial institutions of the
same sort.  In all cases, the model is broader than the Nordic Ombudsman and resembles
the Spanish Defensor del Pueblo or the Portuguese Ouvidor.
50  There are now at least 12
national defensorías in Latin America and Haiti, and scores of regional or municipal
offices.  In several countries that do not presently have such a national office, there is
active debate about creating it.  Several English-speaking Caribbean nations have
Parliamentary ombudsmen, though the institution there is modeled after the British (and
Nordic) precedent.
51
Most of these national offices have been incorporated into the Constitution of
each country.  In others (e.g. Costa Rica), they were created by law, or even by
Presidential decree later ratified by law.  The manner of appointment and conditions of
removal of the Defensor determines his or her independence and impartiality.  For the
most part they are elected by Congress after nomination by the Executive; occasionally
the judiciary has some say as well.  In all cases, however, they are supposed to act
without instructions from any other branch of government (this marks an important
distinction with the Office of the Prosecutor General, which in some countries is charged
with similar functions).  Though their powers of investigation and adjudication are broad,
their decisions are not binding on other bodies.  For this reason, they are generally
defined as magistraturas morales, alluding to their power of persuasion to affect the
conduct of other public officials. Nevertheless, in most cases they are explicitly allowed
to act before the courts, by way of amparo, habeas corpus or petitions for declaration of
unconstitutionality.
52  In addition to these offices with a wide spectrum of powers, there
are several specific offices, like the Ombudsman of the Penitentiary System and the
Office of Protection of Victims of Crime, both created recently under the aegis of the
Federal Ministry of Justice of Argentina.  There have been some experiments as well
with ombudsmen for the police forces, and proposals for the creation of an ombudsman
for the rights of the child.
The rapid expansion of this institution (the very first one in Latin America was
created and filled in Guatemala only about ten years ago) is indicative of the great
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expectations placed on a more dynamic institution to control abuses of power.  On the
other hand, this illustrates the low credibility of traditional institutions like the judiciary
in the eyes of the public.  In any event, if these offices succeed in opening up access to
justice and to being heard by the administration, their existence is amply justified.  They
may also contribute effectively to more transparency in the conduct of the affairs of state.
In fact, the defensores are invariably figures of high visibility in the press, a factor that
undoubtedly helps them perform their tasks.
This high visibility, however, is also their Achilles’ heel. In some cases,
individuals who have occupied the office have used it to launch political careers beyond
it. Some defensores have misused their visibility by engaging in flashy actions of
questionable legal basis and political judgment.  For their part, powerful politicians have
reacted to the popularity of the defensores by refusing to honor their suggestions, by
cutting down their budget through Congress, by attempting to terminate their terms of
office, or simply by filling the post with political cronies when the occasion arrives.
These attitudes, needless to say, constitute a serious risk for the independence,
impartiality and effectiveness of this promising institution.  At this time, most of these
offices operate on a fragile financial basis, almost wholly dependent on funds from
international cooperation agencies.  Beyond the telling symbolism of creating an
institution of control and refusing to fund it appropriately, it is clear that international
assistance will not always be there, and that it could even be inappropriate in certain
circumstances.
 Even with the shortcomings mentioned above, there is no doubt that the domestic
law of most Latin American and Caribbean nations is gradually becoming more
protective of human rights.  New institutions are contributing to this favorable
development; the attitude of some political leaders and government officials (some of
them victims of human rights violations in the past) is also to be credited.  Judges and
court officials are also becoming more sensitive to the needs of persons and collectivities
whose rights have been ignored.  But by far the largest contributing factor is the tireless
and creative work of hundreds of organizations of civil society.  In section one of this
essay we have already mentioned the growth of NGOs as an important positive
development in many areas.  Here we focus on their successes in promoting new
standards of human rights protection, both at the domestic and international level.
The women’s movement in the region has quickly established itself as a main
actor in the formulation of national agendas, particularly in the areas of more equitable
participation in politics, prevention and punishment of domestic violence, effective
protection against discrimination in employment, housing and family law, and
reproductive rights.  Though there is still a lot to be done in those areas, there has been
progress, for example, in the establishment of quotas for women in elective offices, and
access by women to higher education and positions of influence in the judiciary.  There is
also some success in police attention to certain crimes – like domestic violence – of
which women are particularly victimized.  As a matter of international law, the already
mentioned Convention of Belem do Para breaks ground by blurring the traditional23
distinction between the private and public spheres, in establishing State responsibility for
acts of domestic violence.
Organizations that work on children’s rights have also succeeded, not only in a
swift ratification process for the Convention on the Rights of the Child, but also in
obtaining implementing legislation.  Here again there is some stretch of road to cover in
abandoning the old doctrines that treated “minors” as wards of the State and incapable of
choices, and giving effect to the doctrine of integral protection, that treats children as a
certain class of citizens.
53 Even in these times of structural adjustment, some Latin
American NGOs have succeeded in maintaining high visibility for issues of economic,
social and cultural rights.
54
Problems like land tenure and use still do not get the attention they deserve, given
their relationship to the livelihood and fate of millions of the poorest among Latin
Americans.  Non-governmental organizations are trying to remedy this neglect.
Recognition by the State of ancestral land ownership and the return of the internally
displaced to their land are important agenda items of civil society in Guatemala, Mexico
and Colombia.  In Colombia alone, indigenous communities are claiming title to some
five million hectares (12.5 million acres) of land.  Lack of recognition of title by the
State, unfortunately, is only one of the problems.  In many areas, colonizers and new
farmers pushing the frontiers of the market-based economy have dispossessed indigenous
peoples and local campesinos.  They resort to fraudulent titles, to purchases and leases
obtained under questionable circumstances, or simply to occupation.  The struggle for
land that ensues is punctuated often by threats and violence perpetrated by “private
armies” at the service of large landowners or illegal occupants. Communities who were
forced out and displaced by political violence face the same problems when they try to
return.
 55
Accumulation of land and the failure of land reform programs have resulted in
large number of “landless peasants” and the organization of NGOs representing them.
Though generally non-violent, these movements have resorted to controversial land
demonstrations and land occupation that are often met with violence on the other side.
The best known of these organizations is the Brazilian Movement of the Landless (MST
is the acronym in Portuguese).  The Catholic Church in Brazil has given the matter a
great priority, and established a very effective Pastoral Land Commission (CPT).
NGOs representing indigenous peoples have gone to the Inter-American system in
their plight for recognition of ancestral lands, and on this they have been assisted by other
                                                          
53 García Méndez, Emilio, De Menor a Ciudadano, a paper submitted to the Kellogg Institute on
International Relations, University of Notre Dame Press, forthcoming.
54 In addition to the indigenous peoples’ organizations mentioned in Stavenhagen (see Footnote 17) and
women’s groups that challenge the maquila industry’s discriminatory practices against pregnant women,
three NGOs are worth citing for their work on ESC rights: the Colombian Commission of Jurists (CCJ), the
Venezuelan Program for Education and Action on Human Rights (PROVEA), and the Center for Legal and
Social Studies (CELS), of Buenos Aires.
55 IACHR, Third Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Colombia, Ch. X, par. 22 and 23.24
NGOs with expertise in international litigation.
56 The National Indigenous Organization
of Colombia (ONIC), that represents most of the country’s indigenous peoples, has tried
this approach with the assistance of the Colombian Commission of Jurists (CCJ), one of
the hemisphere’s most prestigious human rights groups.  Working jointly, these
organizations have been able also to force investigations into the murder of indigenous
leaders in the context of land struggles, like in the case of the Zenu community.
Another urgent task for both governments and civil society is in the area of prison
conditions and prison reform.  Prisons are the lowest priority of any Latin American and
Caribbean government, and yet there is a constant growth in offenses punishable by
prison and length of prison terms, in consequence of the concern for insecurity discussed
later in this paper.  Prison systems remain more unreachable by efforts at accountability
than any other agency of government, and the result is not only overcrowding and
inhumane treatment, but also frequent riots and violence between inmates.  Local
organizations provide work training for inmates, help distribute crafts made in prison, and
are thus able to have an effective dialogue with prison authorities.  A good example of
this line of work is the Manos Utiles Association of Costa Rica.  In Guatemala, the
Institute on Comparative Penal Studies has conducted diagnostic assessments and policy
recommendations on the penal system.  Covenant House of Central America has been in
the forefront highlighting the situation of children and adolescents in custody and, with
the help of the Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL) won a major case against
Honduras on the mingling of adults and juveniles in prisons.  The Ecumenical
Commission on Human Rights of Ecuador has also done pioneering work on prison
conditions in that country, and successfully litigated the Congo case before the IACHR,
about a mentally disturbed prisoner who died in custody for lack of care.
57  Human
Rights Watch, a well-known international human rights organization, has conducted well-
publicized studies on prison conditions in Brazil, Venezuela, Mexico, Jamaica, Puerto
Rico and Peru, among others, for the last fifteen years.
58
The organizations that began their work in the defense of civil and political rights
during the years of repression led a courageous and often misunderstood battle for the
restoration of democracy.  In some cases, their adaptation to changed circumstances was
not easy, especially as the transitions left unresolved important legacies of the recent past,
like the fate and whereabouts of the disappeared and impunity for egregious crimes.  Yet
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in all cases they engaged in a serious discussion of their role in new contexts.
59
Unfortunately, some pioneering organizations, like the Vicariate of Solidarity of the
Archdiocese of Santiago, decided to close their operations after the return of democracy.
Most others, however, did make a successful transition and now occupy important places
in the policy formulation debate in their countries.
Still, the struggle against serious and massive human rights violations continues in
some Latin American countries, and occasionally it is intensified.  This is especially true,
though not exclusively, in countries that are still experiencing a protracted armed conflict
of a political nature.  In those countries, human rights work is still a hazardous
occupation.  It is particularly sad that, as late as 1998, two prominent human rights
leaders in the region were murdered: Colombian attorney Eduardo Umaña and Mons.
Juan Gerardi, Auxiliary Bishop of Guatemala.  It is even more intolerable that both
crimes remain clouded in mystery and impunity.
In the realm of civil and political rights, human rights organizations are holding
the line, albeit precariously, against the reinstatement of the death penalty in some of our
countries.  They are also preventing politicians from tinkering with codes of criminal
procedure to eliminate due process guarantees for those accused of common crimes.  In
some cases they have been partially successful in forcing police forces to be more
transparent and to allow their members to be properly investigated and prosecuted for the
use of torture and other abuses of police power.
They have had an important success, as well, in the adoption of new standards in
domestic and international law.  An example of this is the emerging “right to truth,” that
Latin American judiciaries and governments are now more ready to accept as an
obligation of the State, even after the promulgation of impunity laws.  When pseudo-
amnesty laws were passed to prevent investigation of the crimes of the recent past, NGOs
challenged them both domestically and before international bodies.  Decisions by the
IACHR and the IACtHR, prompted by NGOs, have been cited frequently for the
proposition that, when it comes to crimes of an egregious nature (such as disappearances,
massacres, torture), the State is obliged to investigate, prosecute and punish the
perpetrators.
60  The UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) has repeatedly stated that these
laws are inconsistent with the ICCPR if their effect is to create an “atmosphere of
impunity.”
 61   The HRC has also frequently insisted that States have an obligation to
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cleanse their armed and security forces of all known perpetrators of these crimes, even if
there are legal impediments to their punishment.
62
 Such an atmosphere is created when known perpetrators are allowed to go
unpunished and when the State refuses to disclose what is known or can be known about
the circumstances of the events, of the role played by different actors, and the fate and
whereabouts of the victims.  That this emerging right to truth has been recognized is a
tribute to the persistence and creativity of NGOs and their lawyers.  In 1995, Argentina
was shaken by the revelations of a Navy officer who told a journalist of his role in
throwing desaparecidos alive from planes into the sea.
63  The late Emilio Mignone, the
country’s most distinguished human rights leader, filed a brief with the Federal Court of
Appeals for Buenos Aires.  On the basis of this new evidence, he petitioned for an order
to investigate the fate of his daughter, taken by the Navy in 1976 and still counted among
the disappeared.  This and similar court actions were eventually accepted by the Supreme
Court of Argentina, establishing that the pseudo-amnesty laws of the 1980s, and the
presidential pardons of the 1990s, were no obstacle for the pursuit of truth through
judicial means.
64  A companion case made its way to the IACHR, and at a hearing in
Washington the Argentine government offered a friendly settlement that has been
accepted by the petitioners and approved by the Commission.  In it, the Government
“accepts and ensures the right to truth that consists in the exhaustion of all possible
means to clarify what happened to disappeared persons (our translation of the original in
Spanish).”  The government further pledges the competency of federal appellate courts
throughout the country to hear these claims, and the appointment of at least two special
prosecutors to assist in the task.
65
The right to know the truth about human rights violations of the recent past is also
being recognized in Chile, after the intense change of circumstances prompted by the
arrest in London of General Pinochet and his protracted legal battle to avoid extradition
to Spain on charges of torture.  Chilean society has realized that the wounds of the past
had remained open despite an official attitude of “enforced reconciliation.”  Even the
armed forces seem ready at least to initiate discussions about the historical record,
something they had arrogantly refused to do until Pinochet’s arrest.  The Truth and
Reconciliation Commission produced an important report at the beginning of the
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democratic transition, but little more had been done since.
66  Now, a Mesa de Diálogo
between NGOs, government representatives and armed forces chiefs is under way.
Although some NGOs have boycotted it claiming that it is a naked attempt to clean up the
international image of the Chilean military, its sole existence is a recognition that the
victims are owed something more than a report.
67
At the international level, civil society organizations have also made impressive
gains in recognition.  In the last three annual meetings of the OAS General Assembly
there have been carefully organized parallel events by a large number of NGOs that
coordinate their agendas and obtain observer status.  Nevertheless, some government
representatives only very grudgingly accept this role, and instead attempt to curb their
limited rights of observation and presence.  A proposal to regulate access to OAS
deliberations by civil society organizations has been under discussion now for several
years.
68
IV.  Unfinished Agenda
Perhaps the greatest challenge facing Latin American democracies is the problem
of social exclusion, i.e., their citizens’ inability to realize their economic, social and
cultural rights, which leads, in turn, to political exclusion. Although in some countries
macroeconomic indicators point to improvements in certain areas, poverty and extreme
poverty, in absolute and relative terms, have actually increased. The biggest debt that the
States have is with the vast majority of their citizens.  Growing numbers of persons do
not have access to basic services such as health, education, food, housing, work, social
security and others, although these are recognized as rights in the constitutions of the
respective countries and in international norms. The States’ failure to guarantee these
rights cannot be challenged because no effective international mechanisms have been
established to protect them (they are not “justiciable”) and because of the widely
accepted notion that the realization of these rights will be "achieved progressively." 
69
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In the Americas, economic, social and cultural rights are recognized in the Charter
of the Organization of American States and in the American Declaration and
Convention.
70  The Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in
the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, known as the Protocol of San
Salvador, was adopted in 1988 but, with an average of only one ratification per year, has
not yet entered into effect.
71  This document is perhaps the best example of an instrument
that fails to provide protection mechanisms: twenty or so rights are recognized in the
protocol, but protection may only be invoked for one right and half of another.
72
The fact that such rights cannot be invoked before the courts leads to the
conclusion that they are norms only in the formal, and not the material, sense, if we
accept the Kelsenian notion that a provision can only be considered a norm when failure
to comply with it entails a sanction, and when complaints mechanisms exist.
73
The situation is not much better in the universal system, since, unlike the
Committee on Civil and Political Rights, the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights cannot accept individual petitions, and its reporting system is weak.
74
In our region, the Inter-American Commission has analyzed the situation
regarding economic, social and cultural rights in its country reports, although not on a
regular basis.  It did so, for example, in its reports on El Salvador (1978) and Haiti
(1979), and, more recently, in those on Brazil (1996), Mexico, (1998) and Colombia
(1999).  In comprehensive reports of this kind, the Commission analyzes the legal
framework of each country, economic and social conditions (based on certain indicators
such as the rate of illiteracy, access to health and educational services, and the
distribution of wealth) and makes recommendations.
As stated earlier, no protection mechanisms were created in the instruments
because it was believed that such rights would be achieved progressively. This theory is
the key to the ill-conceived separation of human rights into different “generations,” a
monumental error of the Cold War era for which we are still paying a high price. Based
on this, other governments with great fanfare point to accomplishments in the area of
civil and political rights because they can show no progress vis-à-vis economic and social
rights, and viceversa. Many governments, recognizing that this occurs not only in our
                                                          
70 Among others, the Preamble and Arts. 33, 44 and 48 of the Charter of the OAS; Arts. XI, XII, XIII, XIV,
XV, XVI and XXII of the American Declaration; and Art.  26 of the American Convention.
71 Art.  21.3 of the Protocol establishes that it will enter into effect when eleven States have ratified it.
72 Under the Protocol, the organs of the inter-American protection system can only consider individual
petitions alleging violations of the right to education (Art.  13) and, of all the trade union rights recognized
in Art.  8, only violations of the right to organize trade unions and to affiliate with others (Art. 19 ).
73 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, Translation  from 2d Rev. and Enl. German Ed. by Max Knight, U. of
California Press, Berkeley, 1967.
74 The reports of several Latin American states are overdue.  See States parties to the Covenant and the
status of submission of reports -as of February 1, 1998- in Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Report on the 16
th and 17
th Periods of Sessions, E/1998/22, Annex I.29
hemisphere, “insist on “choosing” the rights “to prioritize” and promote, putting off the
realization of all others until some time in the future.”
75i .
This problem will only be solved when the states make a serious effort to honor
their commitments and civil society develops strong and creative mechanisms for
exerting pressure on and exercising control over government.  However, steps have been
taken toward justiciability, bearing in mind the relationship that exists between civil and
political, and economic, social and cultural rights, and these experiences are worth
analyzing in our context. The European Court of Human Rights has heard several cases
with strong economic and social implications, despite the fact that its jurisdiction is
limited to violations of the rights enshrined in the European Convention, which, like the
American Convention, focuses almost exclusively on civil and political rights.
76
In one of these cases, a judge of the European Court said that the war on poverty
could not be won by means of a broad interpretation of an instrument dealing with civil
and political rights.  This position may sound reasonable.  However, the issue is the
effective exercise of rights inherent to the human person, regardless of whether or not at
some time they were erroneously divided into civil and political, or economic, social and
cultural rights.  It can hardly be argued that, because of an historical and conceptual error,
the right to adequate food should not be protected because it is an "economic and social"
right.
One solution could be to develop the "justiciable" aspects of certain economic and
social rights.  At all events, sight should not be lost of what is involved.  It seems
inconsistent, even ridiculous, to speak of guaranteeing the (civil and political) right of
freedom of expression when the vast majority of the population cannot read and write
because they do not have access to basic primary education services, which is a social-
economic right.  To date, the division of rights into different categories, and the paradigm
of the progressive development of rights, have served only one purpose: to provide those
States that do not fulfil their obligations with a means of justifying their position.
Another key item on the future human rights agenda in Latin America is the
implementation of women’s rights.
77  While equality and the prohibition of
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discrimination are basic principles that are to be found in all Latin American constitutions
and in the principal instruments of the Inter-American System, present practices, and
even domestic legislation, fail to live up to these principles.
78  Beginning in 1994, the
regional system was strengthened with the adoption of the Convention on the Prevention,
Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women, known as the Pact of Belem do
Para.  Since then, women in the Americas have enjoyed the formal protection afforded
by three mechanisms.
Unlike the United Nations system, which has no specific mechanism for
individual petitions regarding violations of gender-related rights,
79 in our hemisphere, in
addition to individual complaints or petitions brought before the Inter-American
Commission and the Inter-American Court, States are required to submit reports to the
Inter-American Commission on Women (CIM).
80  Such reports should include the
measures adopted to prevent and eradicate violence against women, to assist women who
are victims of violence, the difficulties encountered in implementing such measures, and
the factors that contribute to violence against women.  Lastly, a third mechanism was
created under the Convention of Belem do Para:  the CIM may request advisory opinions
of the Inter-American Court.
81
Despite the inter-American norms, mechanisms and treaty bodies, the situation
faced by Latin American women gives cause for concern, according to the Report of the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on the Status of Women in the Americas,
published in 1999.  This report is based almost exclusively on information submitted by a
number of States in the region.
82  Even so, it points to the existence of problems such as:
restrictions on the exercise of a profession or on work by women insofar as the
authorization of the husband is required; inequality between men and women in
acquiring, administering, and disposing of assets of the conjugal union; differences
between men and women with respect to parental authority; the classification of women
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against women; Optional Protocol, Working Document, IIHR, San Jose, 1998, p.  10.  At its last meeting at
the United Nations, in March 1999, during the forty-third session of the Commission on the Status of
Women, the Working Group approved the draft optional protocol, which would permit individual petitions.
The text now awaits approval by the General Assembly.
80 In addition to the mechanisms contemplated in the American Convention, complaints may be lodged
concerning a state’s violations of its obligations under Article 7 of the Convention of Belem do Para.
81 Created in 1928, the Inter-American Commission of Women was the first official intergovernmental
institution in the world to be expressly assigned responsibility for ensuring recognition of women's civil
and political rights.
82 Nineteen of the Member States of the OAS replied to the questionnaire distributed by the Special
Rapporteur of the IACHR.  Only two civil society organizations filled out and returned the questionnaire,
one in El Salvador and another in Honduras.  Report cit., foreword and p.4.31
with minors; differences with respect to access to the administration of justice;
diminished penalties or the absence of penalties when the victim is a woman; significant
differences in income between men and women; and problems regarding the maternal
mortality rate.
There is also evidence of a relationship between economic and social exclusion,
and political exclusion.  According to the Inter-American Commission’s report, even
though at least fifteen countries have created institutions for the protection or promotion
of women’s human rights, the legislatures and executive branches of Latin America
continue to be dominated by men.
83  Nor is the situation any better in the judicial branch,
where “in many countries in the region, participation by women in the higher levels of
the judiciary is low, and virtually nonexistent at the Supreme Court level."
84  Sad to say,
the States are quite consistent in their actions, for the situation at the national level is
replicated within the inter-American system.  During the twenty years that the Court has
existed, only one of the judges has been a woman.  The Inter-American Commission was
created forty years ago, but has had only four women members among some 45
commissioners along that time, and will have only one woman out of seven in the term
beginning in 2000.
The Convention of Belem do Para entered into effect in March 1995, only a few
months after its adoption.  With twenty-nine ratifications, it is the instrument of the inter-
American system that has been ratified by the largest number of countries.  Although
promising, this development must be weighed against other facts.  The Inter-American
Court has heard only four cases related to gender and, as of late 1997, two years after it
entered into force, the Convention of Belem do Para had been invoked in only one case.
85
The first of the Court’s four decisions dates from 1983, when Costa Rica asked
the Court to issue an advisory opinion on several constitutional amendments related to
nationality and naturalization.  Under one of these, foreign men and women who married
Costa Rican citizens were treated differently.  The Court found that the idea of bestowing
the husband’s nationality on the wife was based on the long-standing practice of granting
the husband and father authority within the marriage and the family, and was therefore an
outgrowth of conjugal inequality.  The Court said that "the different treatment envisaged
for spouses, which applies to the acquisition of Costa Rican nationality in cases involving
special circumstances brought about by marriage, cannot be justified and must be
considered to be discriminatory.”
86  In March 1996, the Inter-American Commission
issued a report in which it dealt with rape as a form of torture.  The Commission found
that the victim in the case concerned had been denied the right to protection of her honor
and dignity, and categorized sexual abuse in general as a “deliberate outrage” to the
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dignity of women.
87  Similarly, in the Loayza Tamayo case, the Commission found that
Peru had violated several articles of the American Convention, inasmuch as the victim
had been subjected to torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, including rape by
agents of the State while she was being detained.  The Court decided that agents of the
Peruvian state had indeed subjected the victim to torture and cruel, inhumane and
degrading treatment; held the State responsible for violating her human rights; and
ordered that she be released and paid compensation.  However, despite having received a
sworn statement from the victim, the Court "without conducting a thorough examination
or explaining the type and nature of the evidence received, or the burden of proof, stated
that it could not conclude that the alleged rape by agents of the State had been proven."
88
The last case also involves a Commission report dating from 1996.  The wife and
thirteen-year-old daughter of a man in prison, referred to as X and Y, were subjected to
vaginal inspections.  The Commission decided to lay down guidelines to be applied in
such cases where rights of inmates and their relatives clashed with legitimate
considerations of prison security.  It also concluded that the Argentine State had violated
the women’s right to physical and moral integrity, to the protection of their honor and
dignity, and the rights of the family and the child, as set forth in the American
Convention.  The Commission recommended that the State of Argentina adopt the
necessary legislation to adjust its provisions to the obligations established by the
Convention, and grant adequate compensation to the victims.
In addition to the system of individual cases, the Commission has referred to
violations of women's rights in several of its country reports.
89  It has frequently
recommended that the Member States adopt concrete measures to combat gender
discrimination.  The IACHR has urged governments to ratify international protection
instruments such as the Convention of Belem do Para. It has also suggested they
incorporate the gender perspective into the formulation and implementation of public
policies, intensify efforts to increase the number of women who hold public office and
give women a bigger role in government decision making.
90  The efforts to improve the
status of women in Latin America are barely beginning, however.
 
Entire populations that were once mistakenly categorized as minorities are also
subject to economic, social and political exclusion.  It is estimated that 400 identifiable
indigenous groups exist in our hemisphere, making up a total population of 40 million
people, ranging from small, numerically insignificant and nearly extinct communities in
the jungles of the Amazon, to rural societies in the Andes whose members number
several millions.  Mexico has the largest indigenous population in Latin America –- ten to
twelve million --, but these peoples account for only 10-15% of the country's total
population.  In contrast, the indigenous peoples of Guatemala and Bolivia make up the
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majority of the population, while in Peru and Ecuador they account for nearly half the
population.
91
Together with the “wave of democratization” that swept through Latin America
in the 1970s and 1980s and the struggles of indigenous organizations, many States
reformed their national constitutions to include provisions on respect for, and the
promotion or protection of, the human rights of indigenous communities.
92  These efforts
marked an attempt to clear away the legacy left by the indigenism that was formally
instituted following the First Inter-American Indigenous Congress, held in Patzcuaro
(Mexico) in 1940.  Indigenism was the first hemisphere-wide policy on the subject and it
had two primary objectives.  The first was to speed up and consolidate the national
integration of Latin American countries.  The second, to promote economic and social
development in order to overcome the “centuries-long backwardness” of these
communities and assimilate them into the Nation-State model.
93  This policy was a
reflection of the societies that existed at the time. Nationalistic and dominated by the
white and mestizo urban middle class, they rejected cultural diversity or did not recognize
the indigenous components of their culture.  Some critics of indigenismo make a
persuasive case that it resulted in a policy of ethnocide.
94 Indigenismo, which in practice
assigned indigenous people the same legal status as minors, did not solve but rather
exacerbated problems related to the recognition of ancestral lands, extreme poverty,
marginalization, malnutrition, attacks on the identity and social unity of the communities,
and forced displacement.  These problems are compounded by the low prices paid for the
crafts and agricultural products of the indigenous population and the lack of space in the
market to sell their products. The nonexistence of basic services, the lack of access to
justice and the failure to recognize their political autonomy -- including the
administration of indigenous or traditional justice, also contribute to the state of injustice
in which indigenous peoples live.
95 They are as serious a handicap to the communities
today as they were fifty years ago, and may have even grown worse.
For its part, the Inter-American Commission has issued several decisions and
demonstrated a greater understanding of the matter.
96 In March 1998, the Inter-American
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Commission was able to get the Government of Paraguay and the Enxet-Lamenxay
communities to reach a friendly settlement, under which the Government of Paraguay
recognized the community’s title to ancestral lands. Under the agreement, the
Government pledged to purchase some 22,000 hectares of land for the communities
concerned and, in order to speed up relocation, to contribute supplies, tools and vehicles
in which to transport the families and their belongings to the new lands. The Inter-
American Court is presently hearing its first case related specifically to the ownership of
ancestral lands, in which the parties are the Awas Tigni community and the State of
Nicaragua.
97
There are many issues that the States and the inter-American system will have to
resolve in the first years of the new millennium.  They include: the definition of the legal
status of indigenous communities, the ownership of ancestral lands and respect for their
cultural diversity -- including their social and legal organization.
98 One issue of special
importance for the effective protection of their rights is the need to rethink the present
concept of human rights –- inherited from the French Revolution -- which recognizes
individual but not collective rights.  This is a conceptual problem, but one which has very
concrete effects and calls for a major intellectual effort and greater commitment.  It is,
indeed, essential for the effective development of indigenous communities.
99
Exclusion has a direct bearing on another conflict for which comprehensive
solutions are urgently needed in Latin America. In addition to political exclusion,
economic and social exclusion directly affects citizens’ security.  The link between social
conditions and criminalization has, of course, long been a focus of the literature of
criminal law and policy.
100 In Latin American cities and streets there is a growing feeling
of insecurity which, in addition to making daily life unpleasant, causes reactions that
threaten the effective exercise of human rights. One, of course, is the all-too-predictable
call to bring back capital punishment,
101 a practice that in the end only makes us feel
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ashamed of what we can do to our fellow human beings in the name of law and order,
even though we know it accomplishes nothing. The feeling of insecurity also leads to the
acceptance by society of other practices that violate human rights. We tend to tolerate an
increase in the number of suspicious “confrontations" involving poorly trained police
forces. Excessive use of force becomes a euphemism for extra-legal or summary
executions and at best we look the other way, at worst we cheer on the “trigger happy”
policemen. Insecurity also breeds acceptance of the widespread practice of incarcerating
people before their guilt has been established. This practice is so widespread that a
number of countries in Latin America can make the dubious claim that up to seventy or
eighty percent of the people being held in their prisons are those who are technically
innocent, because they have not been proven guilty.
102
In many cases, the executive and legislative branches, instead of adopting a
rational and serious approach to the problem, use these feelings of fear and insecurity as a
pretext for “declaring war on crime.” With nothing but political gain in mind, they
promise tough measures. These include longer jail terms and denying parole or early
release from prison to the actual or suspected perpetrators of certain crimes. They can
include also use of paralegal investigative methods that violate constitutional guarantees,
and even greater coercive powers to the security forces.  In other words, politicians are
willing to advocate reaching for whatever it takes to “win the war”, even if it means
trampling over freedoms earned after long societal struggles.
Insistence on this type of measures purporting to solve the complex
citizens' security issue has installed a false dichotomy in civil society.
We are told to choose between respecting human rights and reducing crime.  Our
societies are told, falsely but convincingly, that a crime-fighting policy
respectful of human rights is by definition ineffective to control crime.
Nevertheless, several regional experiences have shown that this is indeed a false
dichotomy. Security programs like Viva Rio in Brazil, or an experiment conducted in the
Hatillos neighborhood of San Jose, Costa Rica, have  directed their efforts at promoting
partnerships between community actors and diverse governmental agencies,
principally the police. They have defined human rights' protection as a primary
goal, and have proven to be efficient in reducing crime. On the other hand, continued
implementation of security policies based on a blunt disregard for fundamental rights had
a devastating effect on civil society.  They have not only failed to solve the
insecurity problem but they have also undermined the public's confidence
in the police and the judiciary.
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Even though it solves nothing, acting tough continues to be the preferred response
of the governments.  A basic principle of law enforcement policy is that the practice of
increasing penalties in abstracto – in paper only -- is ineffective in reducing crime rates.
Experts in this discipline have shown with some degree of certainty that the only true
deterrent is an increase in the real possibility of the perpetrator of a crime actually going
to jail. Furthermore, granting greater powers to police forces that have not yet been fully
purged, and in which some members, hiding behind the institution, devote their time and
best efforts to committing rather than solving crimes, seems almost designed to defeat its
stated purposes.  Unfortunately, any critique of this non-sensical approach is dismissed
with the simplistic argument that equates the protection of human rights with the
“protection of criminals”.
Society is the loser in this war, as it gradually gives up its freedoms in the interest
of winning it and thus legitimizes further violence (now state-sponsored) and greater
exclusion. The machinery of the criminal justice system fosters further social
marginalization and violence. Referring to the operation of criminal justice in Latin
America, Raúl Zaffaroni notes that among its functions “one of the most notorious is the
creation and deepening of social antagonisms and contradictions and the subsequent
weakening and destruction of community, horizontal or affective links.”
103 Society knows
that it is an indisputable fact that jail does not re-socialize anyone,
104 and that it
denigrates and destroys inmates and their families.
105 However, given the fear citizens
feel and the lack of creative options on the part of political leaders, society prefers to
accept the least rational solution: criminal sanctions for social and economic problems.
In consequence, courts are so overburdened with cases that they cannot provide a
proper response, making a vicious cycle even worse. As exclusion increases, so does the
caseload of the courts, the number of cases that go unresolved, the ineffectiveness of the
administration of justice, as well as errors and delays. This increases the feeling of
insecurity, and the perception that nothing works. Changing this vicious cycle into a
virtuous one is a major task facing the democracies in Latin America. A central challenge
for democratic governments in this area is to redefine security policies and incorporate
human rights in the agenda. Of course, an even mightier challenge is to convince
electorates that human rights are not an obstacle to fighting crime but a condition of
effectiveness of any serious security policy.
According to studies on the issue, citizen insecurity is generated by crimes against
property and, to a lesser extent, those against persons.  This is not because victims are
more preoccupied with their property than with their physical integrity, but because in
fact the crime rate grows faster in offenses like theft.  This should by itself indicate a
relationship between social exclusion and rising crime.  On the other hand,  white-collar
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crime, which is committed by those in power, while not creating a feeling of citizen
insecurity, does the most social harm. The accountability of public officials is a key issue
in the Americas. Responsibility has been established for grave violations of human rights
in the past, but the accountability of current public officials has yet to take hold.
Corruption in high places breeds distrust and disaffection with the democratic process.
Its contribution to social and economic exclusion, to political marginalization and to
social violence, is worth some deeper analysis.  Unfortunately, our democracies have a
long way to go in the area of public ethics and accountability of public officials. A
professional and independent judicial branch has a key role to play in this process.
At the risk of sounding pessimistic, it must be said that the reaction of the judicial
branch to these problems leaves much to be desired and that there are serious problems
regarding its independence. As a result, in recent years the credibility of journalists and
other members of the media has been on the rise in Latin America. Journalism has
assumed a key role as watchdog of the actions of government and has investigated many
public officials, something which oversight agencies, the judicial branch included, have
not done. Hence, certain democratic governments in the Americas view journalists as
political enemies and fail to honor their international commitments regarding respect for,
and the promotion of, freedom of expression. This freedom is being restricted as a result
of judicial decisions or laws or decrees issued by the legislative and executive branches.
However, the problem of attacks on freedom of expression goes beyond the existence of
laws and regulations in conflict with international standards, and even beyond arbitrary
judicial or administrative decisions. The number of journalists injured or killed is
considerable and the list of unsolved cases is growing.
106
A recent development illustrates the attitude of some democratic governments
regarding freedom of expression. The most recent General Assembly of the OAS was
about to consider a draft Inter-American Declaration on Freedom of Expression,
proposed originally by the United States --otherwise a true leader in the struggle to
protect freedom of expression in Latin America.  The draft, however, would significantly
water down the protections of Article 13 of the American Convention. During the
discussion process, conducted solely among the missions to the OAS and without
consultation with journalists or civil society, certain Latin American governments
introduced dangerous modifications to the document. The draft declaration would have
replaced the guarantees and protections afforded in Article 13 of the American
Convention with ambiguous language that would have been used to justify certain forms
of censorship and prior restrictions. Thanks to the quick action of entities and persons
concerned with freedom of expression, it was aborted in time.
107
The unfinished agenda of human rights in the Americas must include a serious
look at the normative framework under which free expression is exercised.  In addition to
more serious action to prevent and punish physical attacks against journalists, it is urgent
to abolish all desacato statutes and all press laws of a regulatory kind.  We also need to
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review the statutes on libel, slander and defamation, both criminal and civil, to adjust
them to the needs of a broad, vibrant debate about all public issues in a democratic
society.
V.  Conclusion:
The preceding analysis of the state of democracy and human rights in the
Americas is necessarily sketchy and overly broad.  It is a mistake to assume that
democracy and human rights are in full effect only because elections are generally held.
On the other hand, it would be an even more serious mistake to overlook the immense
benefits and opportunities that the new democratic period offers.  The political leadership
and civil societies of the region have a great opportunity to build a lasting society based
on liberty and justice, yet they sometimes fail to realize that it will not come about by
itself.  The lack of concerted plans to implement human rights norms on a daily basis is in
stark contrast with the willingness to enact lofty principles into constitutional standards.
The problem with the lack of progress is that things are never stagnant in Latin
America and the Caribbean.  If our societies do not move forward to a more satisfactory
democracy, the risk of backsliding into authoritarianism is very real.  It may not be
immediately in the form of military coups d’etat; fortunately, the international milieu in
the year 2000 is very hostile to that kind of adventure.  But messianic leadership and
constitutional reform by sheer will of the majority can well lead Latin America back into
concentration of power, abuse of minority rights and impunity again.
In this paper we have identified several ways in which independent organizations
of civil society are implementing change in different areas.  In their efforts lie the hopes
that the gap between rich and poor, and the distance between leaders and populace, may
be bridged.  Latin America urgently needs an independent and impartial judiciary that is
also effective in dealing with conflict.  There is no other way to build such a judicial
branch than to put the present courts to the test, by suing legal mechanisms creatively in
the search for solutions to political, social and economic problems.  But the agenda
should not be solely a legal one.  The moment is ripe to use the media and its newly
found freedom and credibility to shape the national agenda, not against but with the
political parties – and certainly not yielding its control to politicians.  Human rights
organizations in the whole continent have learned that their task is a strategic one.  In that
sense, they no longer rely exclusively in the immediate duties to defend persons from
abuse, but are placing great emphasis on human rights education at all levels, as a way to
generate the conditions for a lasting and true democracy.
November, 1999.39
                                                                                                                                                                            